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Introduction 
Generational accounting is a relatively new 
method of  reorganizing the government's 
budget data to understand how the burden of 
paying for government spending on goods and 
services is distributed among living and future 
generations.'  To study this distribution, genera- 
tional accounting estimates lifetime net tax 
rates facing different generations under current 
policies.'  For a given generation, the lifetime 
net tax rate is its per capita lifetime net tax bur- 
den as a share of the present value of its per 
capita lifetime labor income. 
The lifetime net tax burden, in turn, is the 
present value of  per capita taxes net of trans- 
fers that members of a generation pay over 
their lifetimes, evaluated as of  their year of 
birth. For generations currently alive, the life- 
time net tax burden includes net taxes they 
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have paid in the past and those they may ex- 
pect to pay in the future. Similar remarks apply 
to the calculation of the present value of a gen- 
eration's per capita lifetime labor income. 
In contrast to the three previous years, a gen- 
erational accounting analysis of U.S. fiscal policy 
was not included in the Budget of  the United 
States for fiscal year 1996.~  This paper presents 
such an analysis. It reports updated lifetime net 
tax rates using the latest long-range tax and ex- 
penditure projections made by the Office of  Man- 
agement and Budget (oMB)." 
Earlier presentations of lifetime net tax rates 
indicated that current U.S. fiscal policy contains 
a large generational imbalance -  a result that 
this update confirms. If  the current fiscal treat- 
ment of living (including newborn) generations 
continues throughout their lifetimes, the life- 
time net tax rate on those born in 1993 would 
be about 34 percent, while future generations 
3  The last generational accounting presentation in  the U.S. Budget 
4  1  The technique of generational accounting was developed in  appeared in Office of Management and Budget (1994), chapter 3. 
Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) and in Kotlikoff (1992). See also 
Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1994). Unless stated otherwise, spend-  4  4  These projections are an extension of the 0~~s  1994 ~id-session 
jug  in this Paper refers to government purchases of goods and services.  Review baseline projection and incorporate, among other things, long- 
term demographic and fiscal projections of the Social Security Adminis- 
2  A generation is defined as individuals of a particular sex born in  tration and the Health Care Financing Administration. 
the same year. would face an average rate of  84 percent.5 
That is, under current policies, hihire generations 
would bear a fiscal burden two-and-a-half times 
as large, on average, than that on the current 
newborn generation. Further, a sizable fiscal im- 
balance remains despite incorporating optimistic 
assumptions about the path of  future federal pur- 
chases and health care outlays in the calculations. 
Such large projected fiscal burdens on future gen- 
erations imply that current fiscal policy is "unsus- 
tainable" -  a conclusion that is robust to alterna- 
tive assumptions about future productivity growth 
and interest rates. 
This method of  calculating the imbalance in 
U.S. fiscal policy has been criticized on several 
grounds. One objection focuses on the assump- 
tion that living generations will continue to be 
treated per current fiscal policy throughout their 
lifetimes, while the tax treatment of  those born in 
the future will differ. To some, this assumption 
seems to imply that the incidence of fciture pol- 
icy changes to correct the imbalance would fall 
exclusively on future generations. They suggest 
that the calculations be altered to include the im- 
pact of  future policy changes on the lifetime net 
tax rates of  living generations, since this will nor- 
mally be the case. Then, they contend, lifetime 
net tax rates on future generations would decline 
from the high levels suggested in earlier genera- 
tional accounting presentations to more plausible 
and acceptable levels, and most of  the dramatic 
conclusions drawn by generational accounting 
would disappear.6 
The assumption of unchanged tax treatment 
of  living generations was only a heuristic and 
was not intended to suggest that future policy 
changes will apply only to future generations. 
Nevertheless, this paper  responds to the criti- 
cism directly by posing a question: What are 
the magnitudes of tax increases, transfer cuts, 
or spending reductions necessary to equalize 
the lifetime net tax rates of  current newborn 
and future generations -  that is, to restore a 
generationally balanced fiscal policy? 
The experiments assume that policy changes, 
when introduced, will apply to all generations 
alive then and in every year thereafter. Hence, 
the new policies will affect the lifetime net tax 
rates of  most generations alive in  1993, our base 
year. The tax, transfer, and spending policy ex- 
periments are conducted for a set of  baseline 
projections of future revenues and outlays as 
well as for alternative assumptions about the 
growth paths of  federal purchases and health 
care outlays. In each case, we report the changes 
in taxes, transfers, or purchases needed to equal- 
ize lifetime net tax rates of  future and current 
newborn generations. We  also present the val- 
ues of  the equalized lifetime net tax rates. 
The calculated tax hikes, transfer reductions, 
or spending cuts required for achieving a genera- 
tionally balanced fiscal policy are immense - 
much larger than those recently considered by 
Congress as part of  the debate to balance the 
budget by the year 2002. Thus, achieving a bal- 
anced budget by that date would not place U.S. 
fiscal policy. on a sustainable path unless budget 
balance were preserved thereafter. The reason is  : 
that under culrent projections, growth in outlays 
after 2002 will far outstrip growth in revenues, 
and maintaining a balanced budget beyond 2002 
is likely to require cuts in addition to those 
needed just  to balance the budget by that year. 
The policy changes required to equalize life- 
time net tax rates of  newborn and future gen- 
erations can be viewed as alternative measures 
of  the imbalance in current U.S. fiscal policy. 
Unlike the critics' conjecture, these measures 
also suggest that a substantial imbalance is em- 
bedded in current U.S. fiscal policy. 
I.  How Are 
Generational 
Accounts and 
Lifetime Net Tax 
Rates ~omputed?~ 
Generational accounts refer to the present val- 
ue of taxes net of  transfers that a member of 
each generation may expect to pay on average 
now and in the future. Thus, generational ac- 
counts reveal the prospective  net tax burdens 
on different generations. In contrast, lifetime 
generational accounts include net taxes paid in 
the past and refer to the present value of  net 
taxes as of  the generation's year of  birth. 
5  The estimates presented in Office of  Management  and Budget 
(1994), chapter 3, were 36.3 percent on current (1992) newborns and 82 
percent on future generations. The differences in the estimates reported 
here stem from technical improvements incorporated in the calculations 
as well as from the use of previously unavailable long-range budgetary 
projections provided by the OMB. The lifetime net tax rates reported are 
averaged across male and female generations. 
6  For examples of such criticism, see Eisner (1994) and Haveman 
(1994). Another criticism, not dealt with here, stems from the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition, which states that current generations, perceiving 
the tax increases on future generations implicit in the deficit financing of  cur- 
rent government spending, will respond by increasing their saving and be- 
quests. However, formal tests fail to detect the altruistic behavior required for 
Ricardian equivalence. See Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992). 
W  7  This section presentsa brief discussion of  the method of genera- 
tional accounting. For more detailed treatments, see Auerbach, Gokhale, and 
Kotlikoff (1991) and Kotlikoff (1992). See also Office of Management and 
Budget (1994), chapter 3. A.  Living 
Generations 
Lifetime generational accounts are used here to 
compute the lifetime net tax rate facing each 
generation born between 1900 and 1993. The 
calculations use National Income and Product 
Account data on federal, state, and local taxes, 
transfers, and spending for each year up to 
1993, as well as OMB projections of these ag- 
gregates up to 2030.8 
In the computational procedure, total taxes 
and expenditures are classified into several cate- 
gories for each year between 1900 and 2030. We 
include taxes on incomes from labor and capital, 
payroll taxes, and indirect taxes. Expenditures re- 
fer to transfers such as Social Security, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other welfare payments, plus gov- 
ernment purchases. The amount in each tax and 
transfer category is distributed among generations 
alive in a certain year-  cohorts by single year of 
age and sex ranging from newborn to 100 years 
old. For years prior to and including 1993, we 
use actual population data to perform this distri- 
bution; for future years, we use population pro- 
jections from the Social Security ~drninistration.~ 
The amounts of  per capita taxes or transfers 
distributed to members of each generation are 
determined according to relative profiles of  tax 
payments and transfer receipts obtained from mi- 
croeconomic surveys.10 Current and past taxes 
and transfers are distributed among different gen- 
erations using available information on age- and 
sex-specific payments and receipts for those 
years. For some categories, such as Social Secu- 
rity transfers, relative profiles are available for 
each year between 1960 and 1992. For others, 
profiles are available for only a few of the years. 
For each payment and receipt category, the earli- 
est available profile is used for distributing pay- 
ments and receipts in prior years. Similarly, the 
latest available profile is used to distribute the 
amounts in later (including future) years. 
For years beyond 2030, we project the per 
capita amounts of taxes and transfers by apply- 
ing a growth factor to the values for the year 
8  All outlays and receipts are measured in 1993 dollars. 
9  We use the intermediate population projections through 2066 
made by the Social Security Administration. We then extend these projec- 
tions through 2200 using the mortality, fertility, and immigration assump- 
tions applicable in 2066. 
10  These surveys include the Survey of  Consumer Expenditures by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Survey of  Income and Program Participa- 
tion by the Bureau of the Census, the Current Population Survey by the Bu- 
reau of the Census, the Annual Abstracts of the Social Security Bulletin by 
the Social Security Administration, and the Survey of Consumer Expendi- 
tures by the Federal Reserve System. 
2030. The prospective generational account for 
each current (1993) generation is computed by 
subtracting total transfer receipts from total tax 
payments in each future year that the genera- 
tion will be alive, actuarially discounting the re- 
sulting net tax payments back to 1993 using an 
assumed rate of interest, r,  and summing over 
the remaining years of life for that generation. 
The computation of the lifetime generational 
account for a given generation alive in 1993 uses 
the same type of calculation, except that net 
taxes paid in the past are also included. More- 
over, the annual net taxes are actuarially dis- 
counted back to the generation's year of blrth. In 
the case of  the generation aged 43 in 1993 (those 
born in 19501, for example, per capita net taxes 
paid up to 1993 and projected net taxes paid up 
to 2050 (age 100) are capitalized to yield a gen- 
erational account as of  1950. 
The present value of  lifetime labor income 
is used as a base to calculate the lifetime net 
tax rate for each generation. As  mentioned ear- 
lier, the lifetime net tax rate is the lifetime gen- 
erational account as a percent of the present 
value of  lifetime labor income. For each gen- 
eration, the stream of per capita labor income 
earned in each year up to 1993 and projected 
income for future years is capitalized to pro- 
duce the present value of  lifetime labor in- 
come. We derive the estimates of per capita 
labor income in a manner similar to that for 
deriving per capita taxes and transfers: In each 
year, labor's share of net national income is 
distributed by relative profiles of  labor income. 
These profiles are based on individual wage 
and salary data from the Census Bureau's Cur- 
rent Population Survey and are constructed for 
the years 1963 through 1992. 
The implications of current fiscal policy for the 
lifetime net tax rates on future generations 
(those born after 1993) can be derived by using 
the accounts of generations currently alive. This 
computation requires a consideration of the 
government's intertemporal budget constraint, 
which can be specified as 
Equation (1) states that the present value of the 
government's current and projected purchases, 
PVSPEND,, must equal the government's current 
net worth, GW,, plus the present value of pro- 
spective net tax payments of  all generations currently alive, PVCt, plus the present value of 
net tax payments of all future generations, 
PIPl . The sum of  prospective generational ac- 
counts over all individuals currently alive pro- 
vides an estimate of  PW,  . 
We estimate the value of  PVSPEND, by com- 
puting the present value of  current and projected 
government spending on goods and services. 
Projections of  purchases through 2030 assume 
that government purchases will keep pace with 
population growth and with increases in labor 
productivity. Spending projections beyond 2030 
are made by applying a growth factor to per cap- 
ita spending in 2030. Under the assumption that 
the 2030 spending per capita will be maintained 
thereafter (except for an adjustment for growth), 
aggregating the per capita amounts across the 
(projected) population for years beyond 2030 
yields total spending for these years. 
The per capita amounts of  purchases in 
2030 are obtained by dividing the 2030 value 
of total purchases into one general and three 
age-specific categories and distributing these 
equally across the relevant (projected) popula- 
tion segments for the year 2030. Finally, we es- 
timate GW, by cumulating annual government 
deficits over time."  For the United States, the 
value of  GW, is negative because government 
budgets have been in deficit for most years 
during the last several decades. 
Knowing three of  the four terms in equation 
(1) enables us to derive the remaining item, 
PlrF,, as a residual. Thus, PW, is the amount 
of the present value of  government purchases 
not covered by current government net worth 
plus the present value of  current and future 
net tax payments by living generations. This re- 
sidual must be paid for by net tax payments to 
be levied on generations as yet unborn. 
Although the manner in which the residual 
burden will be distributed across unborn gen- 
erations is unknown today, we can illustrate its 
magnitude by distributing it according to some 
predetermined rule. Here, we adopt the crite- 
rion that the distribution should equalize the 
lifetime net tax rates of  all future generations. 
This requires that the residual burden be dis- 
tributed equally across all future generations 
except for an adjustment for growth."  Thus, 
generations born in year t pay net tax burdens 
1 + g times the net tax burdens of generations 
born in year t -  1, where g is the annual rate 
of growth of  labor productivity.'3  Because fu- 
ture labor income is assumed to grow at rate 
g, this adjustment imposes equal lifetime net 
tax rates on all future generations. 
A comparison of  the lifetime net tax rate on 
future generations with that on newborn gen- 
erations is one way to estimate the degree of 
generational imbalance embedded in current 
fiscal policy. The lifetime net tax rate on new- 
born generations is derived by finding the ratio 
of  the present value of their net tax payments 
under currentpolicyprojections to the present 
value of  their lifetime labor incomes. If a growth- 
adjusted distribution of the residual burden 
among future generations produces a lifetime 
net tax rate significantly larger than that on cur- 
rent newborns, fiscal policy can be viewed as 
being biased against future generations. If the 
lifetime net tax rate on future generations is 
judged as being prohibitively high, current fis- 
cal policy may be deemed unsustainable. 
II.  Generational 
Accounts and 
Lifetime Net 
Tax Rates for the 
United States 
A.  Prospective 
Generational 
Accounts 
Baseline prospective generational accounts for 
selected generations alive in 1993 are shown in 
tables 1 and 2. The calculations include all fed- 
eral, state, and local government taxes, trans- 
fers, and spending on goods and services and 
assume that government spending on goods 
and services will keep pace with population 
and productivity growth. They also incorporate 
conservative estimates of  growth in government 
11  This method does not include the value of government physical 
assets in GW,.  However, if it did, one would have to include the present 
value of imputed rent on these assets in PVSPEND,,  representing the 
government's purchase of the service flow from these assets for public 
consumption. Because these two items would be equal in present value, 
constraint (1)  would be unaffected. 
12  Equal absolute distribution of the residual burden would suc- 
cessively reduce the lifetime net tax rates on generations born later be- 
cause continued productivity growth will cause their labor income to 
exceed that of generations born earlier. A growth-adjusted distribution of 
the residual burden would result in the imposition of equal lifetime net 
tax rates on all future generations. For a further discussion of these is- 
sues, see Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1994). 
13  We assume that the ratio of per capita net tax burdens on future 
male and female generations is the same as that on newborns. The Composition of  Male Generational 
Accounts (r = 0.06, g=  0.012) 
(present values in thousands of 1993 dollars) 
Taxes Paid  Transfers Received 
Labor  Capital 
Generation's  Net Tax  Income  Income  Payroll  Excise  Social 






















Percentage Difference in Net Payments 
Future  147.1  -  -  -  -  - 
generations 
and age zero 
a. Generations born in 1994 and thereafter. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. - 
health care outlays. The growth of  Medicare 
and Medicaid expenditures averaged 7.4 and 
15.5 percent, respectively, over the last five 
years. The baseline incorporates a rapid growth 
in these outlays until 2005, with somewhat 
slower growth thereafter.I4 
The prospective net tax burdens shown in ta- 
bles 1 and 2 exhibit a pronounced life-cycle pat- 
tern. Working-age generations, who are in their 
high earning and taxpaying years, have positive 
net tax burdens: The present values of  their in- 
come, payroll, and indirect taxes are large, but 
values of  receipts from Social Security and health 
care transfers are small. The opposite result holds 
true for older generations. 
In 1993, newborn males may expect to pay 
$87,200, and newborn females $53,200, on net, 
under baseline policies during their remaining 
lifetimes. In contrast, average lifetime net tax 
burdens amount to $215,500 for future males 
and $131,500 for future females if  the fiscal 
treatment of  living generations continues un- 
der baseline  policies. 
As  mentioned earlier, prospective genera- 
tional accounts can be combined with past net 
tax payments to calculate lifetime net tax burdens 
for all living generations. Taken as fractions of  life- 
time labor incomes, they yield lifetime net tax rates. 
Table 3 shows baseline lifetime gross and net tax 
rates and gross transfer rates for generations 
14  Post-2005 growth rates for Medicare and Medicaid outlays are 
the OMB's best estimates. The growth rates used in all calculations are 
available from the authors upon request. '  : 
The Composition of  Female Generational 
Accounts (r = 0.06, g=  0.012) 
(present values in thousands of 1993 dollars) 
Taxes Paid  Transfers Received 
Labor  Capital 
Generation's  Net Tax  I~~~~~  Income  Payroll  Excise  Social 






















a  Generations born in 1994 and thereafter. 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. - 
Lifetime Net Tax Rates for 
Living and Future Generations 
under Baseline Assumptions 
Generations by  Net  Gross  Gross 














a. Generations born in 194  and thereafter. 
NOTE:  Calculations incorporate OMB projections 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
born in the year 1900 and in every tenth year 
thereafter. 1t also presents these rates for i993 
newborns and future generations. 
The lifetime net tax rates are population- 
weighted averages over male and female gen- 
erations born in the same year. Table 3 shows 
that lifetime net tax rates have risen from 
nearly 24 percent on generations born in 1900 
to more than 34 percent on those born in 
1993.15 For newborns in 1993, the net tax rate is 
the difference between a gross tax rate of  51 per- 
cent and a gross transfer rate of  17 percent. The 
gross tax rate includes taxes on labor and capital 
income, payroll taxes, and indirect and other 
taxes. The gross transfer rate encompasses re- 
ceipts from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, 
15  More precisely, this rise occurred between 1900  and 1970. Life- 
time net tax rates on generations born after 1970  will be maintained at 
34.2 percent if  generations currently alive continue to be treated per base- 
line fiscal policies. and other welfare transfers. The lifetime net 
Lifetime Net Tax Rates for Living and 
Future Generations under Alternative 
Health Care and Federal Spending Paths 
Slower  Slower 
Generations  Slower  Health  Health Care 
by Year  Spending  Care  and Spending 















a. Federal spending is held constant in real terms after the year 2000. 
b.  Health care spending grows at a 2 percent slower rate than the baseline 
through 2005, followed by baseline growth. 
c.  Generations bom in 1994 and thereafter. 
NOTE:  Calculations incorporate OMB projections. 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
tax rate on future generations is  a staggering 
84 percent, which is almost two-and-a-half 
times as large as that on newborns in 1993.16 
Table 4 reports lifetime net tax rates under 
alternative future paths for outlays on health 
care and federal purchases. Specifically, col- 
umn 1  of table 4 repeats the baseline lifetime 
net tax rates of table 3. Column 2 shows the ef- 
fect pf freezing real federal spending on goods 
and services permanently beginning in 2000. 
Lifetime net tax rates of all living generatibns 
are unchanged, since neither future tax nor 
transfer payments are affected by this policy. 
However, because reducing federal purchases 
lessens the residual burden on future genera- 
tions, their lifetime net tax rate is lowered to 
73 percent. This result suggests that freezing 
federal purchases permanently is not sufficient 
to put the U.S. fiscal house in order from a gen- 
erational accounting perspective. 
Column 3 of  table 4 reports the effect of  as- 
suming a 2 percent slower growth in health care 
outlays until 2005, with baseline growth thereaf- 
ter. Slower growth in health care spending raises 
the lifetime net tax rates of  young and middle- 
aged living generations -  those who will receive 
lower health care transfers as a result. It also re- 
duces the lifetime net tax rate on future genera- 
tions by 14 percentage points. Thus, although 
Percentage Difference under Alternative 
lnterest and Growth Rates: Baseline 
g =  0.007  0.012  0.017 
r = 
0.03  120  119  122 
0.06  158  147  137 
0.09  280  261  243 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. - 
erational imbalance in U.S. fiscal policy, a sizable 
imbalance may still remain. 
Column 4 of  table 4 shows the effect of  com- 
bining the policies of  columns 2 and 3 -an  opti- 
mistic scenario. This reduces the hfetirne net tax 
rate on future generations from 84 percent to 59 
percent. Thus, even if  federal purchases are not 
increased beyond current levels and growth in 
health care outlays is 2 percentage points lower 
than the baseline over the next 10 years, future 
generations will incur hfetirne net tax rates that 
are 64 percent larger, on average, than those fac- 
ing current newborns. 
The baseline and other policies discussed so 
Percentage Difference under Alternative 
lnterest and Growth Rates: Slower Health Care 
Growth and Constant Real Federal Purchases 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
far use a 6 percent rate of  discount (r  = 0.06) 
and a 1.2 percent rate of  average productivity 
growth (g = 0.012) to project taxes, transfers, and 
16  Note that future generations' lifetime net tax rate is derived by 
distributing the residual of the present value of government spending af- 
ter government  net worth and the net contribution of living generations 
have been deducted. Hence, it cannot be subdivided into gross tax and 
transfer rates. purchases  beyond  2030."  Table 5 presents the 
percentage difference between the lifetime net 
tax rates on future and 1993 newborn genera- 
tions under alternative interest and productivity 
growth rates for the baseline.''  Table 6 depicts 
the same calculation for the optimistic scenario 
slower  of  slower health care outlay growth and constant 
.%wer  Health  real federal spending. 
Slower  Health  Care and 
Spending  Care  Spending  Using a higher discount rate while keeping 
Baseline  Growtha  Growthb  Growth  the productivity growth rate constant can have 
A.  policy Change in 1996  an ambiguous effect on the percentage differ- 
Tax Increases  ential. In present-value calculations, a higher 
Income taxC  42.6  32.9  29.1  19.6  rate of  discount reduces the relative weight on 
Income tax (fed. only)  51.9  40.1  35.5  23.9  net payments that are further into the future. 
Payroll tax  64.5  49.9  44.1  29.7  Hence, I the profile of  aggregate net tax pay- 
Indirect taxes  69.8  54.0  47.7  32.1 
,  All  taxes  18.6  14.4  12.7  8.5  ments by living generations is rising through 
time while that of  government purchases is fall- 
Transfer Cuts 
Social Security  95.0  73.5  65.0  43.7  ing, a higher discount rate will tend to increase 
Health  59.2  45.8  49.0  33.0  the residual burden on future generations. If 
All  transfers  32.8  25.3  24.8  16.7  the slopes of  the time profiles of  spending and 
Spending Cuts  net payments are reversed, a higher discount 
Entire government  31.6  26.3  21.7  15.8  rate may reduce the residual burden. Similar re- 
Federal  97.4  93.7  0.9  60.:  marks apply for varying the rate of  productiv- 
Federal nondefense  - 
d  -  d  -  d  - 
ity growth while keeping the discount rate 
B.  policy Change in 2001  fixed. Despite the ambiguity, however, it is use- 
Tax Increases  ful to examine whether the conclusion of  an 
Income taxC  51.5  39.9  35.2  23.7  imbalanced U.S. fiscal policy is sustained over 
Income tax (fed. only)  :  2:  :  :  a reasonable range of  interest and growth rates. 
Payroll tax 
Indirect taxes  87.5  67.7  59.8  40.3  Table 5 shows that for many such rates, the 
All  taxes  22.8  17.6  15.6  10.5  Metirnenettaxrateoffuturegenerationsismore 
Transfer Cuts 
Social Security  -  87.2  77.0  51.8 
Health  66.4  51.4  55.8  37.5 
All  transfers  37.8  29.3  28.9  19.5 
Spending Cuts 
Entire government  38.8  32.9  26.7  19.7 
Federal 
d  -  - 
d 
84.9  80.2 
Federal nondefense  -  -  d  -  d  -  d 
Tax Increases 
Income taxC 
Income tax (fed. 
Pavroll tax 
only) 
C.  Policy Change in 2016 
~nhirect  taxes  '  189.2  146.4  129.4  87.1 
All  taxes  45.2  35.0  30.9  20.8 
Transfer Cuts 
Social Security 
d  -  -  -  d  87.4 
Health  -  83.2  90.7  61.0 
All  transfers  63.4  49.1  48.9  32.9 
Spending Cuts 
Entire government  73.0  65.3  50.5  39.3 
Federal  -d  4  -  d  -  d 
Federal nondefense  9  - 
d  d  -  -  d 
a.  Federal purchases are held constant in real terms after the year 2000. 
b.  Health care spendmg grows at a 2 percent slower rate than the baseline 
through 2005, followed by baseline growth. 
c.  Federal, state, and local income taxes. 
d. Requires a reduction of  more than 100 percent. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. 
than twice as large as that of  1993 newborns. Un- 
der optimistic projections (table 6),  the percent- 
age dfierentials range from 38 percent to 149 
percent. Thus, the conclusion that current U.S. 
fiscal policy is severely imbalanced remains true 
under a wide range of interest and growth rates, 
despite using optimistic assumptions about future 
federal purchases and health care outlay paths. 




Next, to address the methodological criticism 
discussed earlier, we compute the tax increases, 
transfer cuts, or spending reductions necessary 
17  Earlier presentations of generational accounting assumed a 
0.75 percent rate of productivity growth. The OMB's latest budget projec- 
tions through 2030 incorporated  the assumption of a 1.2 percent rate of 
productivity growth (defined in terms of GDP per worker). This dictated 
the use of the same rate for years beyond 2030. 
18  The percentage difference  is calculated as ([FICI-I) x 100, 
where F is the lifetime net tax rate on future generations and C is the 
same rate on 1993 newborns. Equalized Lifetime Net ~m@at$s  for 
Newborn and ~4tu~~enei$@bns  ' 
Resulting frbm~able  7~olides~ 
(percent) 
Slower 
Slower  Health 
Slower  Health  Care and 
Spending  Care  Spending 
Baseline  Growtha  Growthb  Growth 
Tax Increases 
Income taxC 
Income tax (fed. 
Payroll tax 
Indirect taxes 
All  taxes 
A.  Policy Change in 1996 
Transfer Cuts 
Social Security  38.1  37.2  38.7  37.8 
Health  39.9  38.6  39.8  38.6 
All  transfers  39.7  38.5  39.8  38.5 
Spending Cuts 
Entire government  34.2  34.2  36.0  36.0 
Federal  34.2  34.2  36.0  36.0 
Federal nondefense  -  d  -  d  d  -  d 
A 
B.  Policy Change in 2001 
Tax Increases 
Income taxC  44.5  42.2  43.1  40.8 
Income tax (fed. only)  44.6  42.2  43.1  40.8 
Payroll tax  46.0  43.4  44.1  41.5 
Indirect taxes  46.4  43.6  44.4  41.6 
All  taxes  45.4  42.9  43.7  41.2 
Transfer Cuts 
Social Security  -  37.6  39.1  38.1 
Health  40.4  39.0  40.2  38.8 
All  transfers  40.4  39.0  40.3  38.9 
Spending Cuts 
Entire government  34.2  34.2  36.0  36.0 
Federal  -  d  - 
d  36.0  36.0 
Federal nondefense  -  -  d  -  d  -  d 
C.  Policy Change in 2016 
Tax Increases 
Income taxC  52.5  48.4  48.6  44.5 
Income tax (fed. only)  52.6  48.4  48.6  44.5 
Payroll tax  55.6  50.8  50.7  45.9 
Indirect taxes  51.7  47.8  48.0  44.1 
All  taxes  53.2  48.9  49.0  44.8 
Transfer Cuts 
d  -  d  Social Security  -  -  38.8 
Health  -  40.8  41.8  39.9 
All  transfers  43.0  41.0  42.0  40.0 
Spending Cuts 
Entire government  34.2  34.2  36.0  36.0 
Federal 
A  d 
A  d  A  d  d 
Federal nondefense  - 
d  -  d  -  d  -  d 
- - 
a.  Federal purchases are held constant in real terms after the year 2000. 
b.  Health care spending grows at a 2 percent slower rate than the baseline 
through 2005, followed by baseline growth. 
c.  Federal, state, and local income taxes. 
d.  Requires a reduction of  more than 100 percent. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. 
to eliminate the generational imbalance in U.S. 
fiscal policy. Various combinations of  all three 
policies are introduced beginning in 1996, 
2001, and 2016. Because the new policies are 
applicable to all generations alive when they 
are introduced, they will affect the lifetime net 
tax rates of most living generations. In each 
case, we calculate the permanent percentage 
increase (or reduction) required in taxes, trans- 
fers,,or purchases in order to equalize the life- 
time net tax rates of  1993 newborn and fyture 
generations. 
Panel A of  table 7 presents the percentage 
by which various taxes, transfers, and spend- 
ing will have to change beginning in 1996 to 
eliminate the generational imbalance. The re- 
quired percentage increases are shown for the 
baseline and for the alternative federal spending 
and health care outlay growth paths analyzed 
in table 4. Under baseline projections, income 
tax revenues would have to increase perma- 
nently by almost 43 percent beginning in 1996 
to equalize the lifetime net tax rates of new- 
born and future generations. This implies that 
the average income tax rate would have to rise 
from 15.7 percent currently to 22.3 percent im- 
mediately and permanently. 
Under the fortuitous case of  slow growth in 
health care outlays and zero growth in federal 
purchases, income taxes would have to increase 
by about 20 percent. If  only federal income taxes 
are considered, the required increases in annual 
revenues range between 24 and 52 percent; those 
necessary under payroll or indirect tax hike poli- 
cies are even larger. If  all taxes are considered, 
eliminating the imbalance in U.S. fiscal policy 
would require tax hikes of about 19 percent un- 
der baseline projections and 8.5 percent under 
the optimistic scenario. 
Cuts in transfers to establish equal Metime net 
tax rates on newborn and future generations 
would also be severe. Under the baseline projec- 
tion, a 33 percent permanent and across-the- 
board reduction in transfers beginning in 1996 
would be necessary to restore a generationally 
balanced policy. Alternatively, restoring balance 
would require permanently reducing the size of 
combined federal, state, and local government 
purchases by 32 percent beginning in 1996. 
Table 8 shows the value at which the lifetime 
net tax rates on 1993 newborns and future gen- 
erations would be equalized under the corre- 
sponding policies shown in table 7. Under 
baseline projections, for example, increasing all 
taxes permanently by 19 percent beginning in 
196  would raise the lifetime net taxes of  1993 
newborns from 34 percent to 44 percent and 100 percent. For example, eliminating health 
care transfers entirely beginning in 2016 would 
not be sufficient to restore a generationally bal- 
anced policy. 
The required hikes in taxes or cuts in trans- 
fers and spending to restore generational eq- 
Balanced 
Generations by  Budget  uity are quite considerable. The main message 
Year of  Birth  Baseline  Proposal  ~ifference~ of  this section is that no matter how one 
1900  23.6  23.6  0.0  chooses to calculate it, the mammoth size of 
I  1910  27.0  27.1  0.1  the imbalance in U.S. fiscal policy cannot be 
1920  29.1  29.2  0.1  made to disappear. Moreover, policy changes 
i 
1930  30.4  30.6  0.2  to correct the imbalance need to be introduced 
1940  31.4  31.7  0.3  sooner rather than later: Procrastination will 
1950  32.6  33.1  0.5  only make the medicine more bitter. 
I  1960  33.5  34.0  0.5 
1970  34.1  34.8  0.7 
11  1980  34.2  35.2  1.0 
I  1990  34.2  35.2  1  .o  Ill.  The Balanced 
I  1993  34.2  35.1  0.9  Budget Amendment 
Future generationsC  84.4  72.5  -11.9 
This section contrasts the policies required for 
a. Present value of lifetime net taxes as a ratio of  the present value of life-  restoring generational balance in fiscal 
time labor income. 
b.  Percentage-point increase in the net tax rate if the balanced budget pro-  with those being considered by policymakers 
posal is adopted.  today. Whde debating the adoption of a balanced 
c.  Generations born in 1994 and thereafter. 
I  SOURCE: ~uthors'  calculations.  budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
I  Congress recently considered proposals to cut 
I  - all outlays except for defense and Social Secu- 
rity. Here, we consider the impact of similar 
reduce that on future generations from 84 percent  cuts on the generational stance of  U.S. fiscal 
to 44 percent. That is, increasing all taxes pema-  policy. The outlay reductions involve cuts in 
nently by  19 percent is equivalent to increasing  nondefense discretionary spending ranging 
lifetime net tax rates of  193  newborns by almost  from 1  percent in 1996 to 4 percent in 2002 
30 percent. Note that the equahed lifetime net tax  from our baseline values. For Medicare and 
rates on newborn and future generations are differ-  Medicaid, the reductions range from 3 percent 
ent for different policies. If  an across-the-board  in 1996 to 14 percent in 2002. Finally, cuts in 
transfer cut were adopted instead of  an across-the-  other mandatory spending categories range 
board tax hlke, lifetime net tax rates on newborn  from 4 percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 2002. 
and future generations would be equalized at 40  For each category, the percentage cut for 2002 
percent instead of  44 percent.  is preserved in later years.'g 
Delaying policy changes to restore a genera-  Table 9 shows the impact of this proposal 
tionally balanced fiscal policy is likely to prove  on the lifetime net tax rates of  living and future 
costly. This can be seen from panels B and C  generations. The rates are higher for living, 
in tables 7 and 8. Raising income taxes begin-  especially younger, generations. The rate for 
ning in 2001 instead of  in 1996 will necessitate  generations born in 1950, for example, in- 
an increase of  52 percent instead of  43 percent.  creases by 0.5 percent, while that for 1993 new- 
Similarly, initiating cuts in government pur-  borns is almost l percentage point higher. 
chases in 2001 instead of  in 1996 will deepen  The proposal would imply a reduction in the 
the cuts to 39 percent from 32 percent.  Intro-  lifetime net tax rate of  future generations from 
ducing these policies in 2016 will push the re-  84 to 73 percent. 
quired income-tax hike to 98 percent and will  The outlay cuts analyzed here redress the 
increase the cuts required in government pur-  imbalance to some extent, but still leave an un- 
chases to 73 percent.  sustainably large lifetime net tax rate on future 
The same is true for all other tax increases  generations. Thus, under what we consider to 
and transfer or spending cuts. Indeed, some 
spending and transfer cuts that will restore gen- 
erational balance if implemented in 1996 are  H  19  These cuts balance the federal budget by the year 2002 from a 
no longer feasible if implemented in 2001 or  "current law" baseline in which federal discretionary spending is frozen 
2016 because the required cuts would exceed  in nominal terms. Under our conservative baseline, however, the budget 
remains in deficit in all future years. be conservative but reasonable budget projec- 
tions, future Congresses may need to rein in 
outlays or increase revenues further to restore 
generational balance to U.S. fiscal policy. 
Given the results of the previous section, leav- 
ing such large adjustments for future considera- 
tion is likely to prove costly. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The generational stance of current U.S. fiscal 
policy is badly out of balance. It is impossible 
to avoid this conclusion no matter which of 
many alternative measures one uses to analyze 
the generational distribution of net tax burdens. 
Although tax cuts seem to have widespread 
political appeal today, the analysis presented 
here suggests that enacting them may be the 
wrong thing to do. 
In fact, the early adoption of  fiscal measures 
to reduce the projected heavy net tax burdens 
on future generations is imperative. This re- 
quires either increasing taxes or reducing gov- 
ernment outlays today. Redressing the current 
U.S. fiscal imbalance is important because such 
heavy burdens will prove economically infeasi- 
ble to impose on future generations in view of 
the fact that gross tax rates would have to be 
higher than net tax rates. Moreover, imposing 
high lifetime net tax burdens on future genera- 
tions may depress their incentives to work, 
save, and invest, thereby hurting future Arneri- 
cans' living standards. Finally, the analysis 
shows that postponing the adoption of  correc- 
tive measures will only worsen the choices 
available to policymakers in the future. 
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